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Introduction 
Health and disease are normally seen as the poles 
of a continuum, and it is widely supposed that an 
objective demarcation line exists at some point 
along the spectrum. But the dividing-line 
between health and disease is artificial. It is a 
man-made distinction, not a natural one. In 
reality no distinct line can be drawn between 
health and disease since the meaning of these 
terms varies according to cultural, social, econ- 
omic, anthropological and medical factors. Thus 
there are many possible lines of demarcation, 
each of which is drawn to serve particular ends. 
And this fact has far-reaching social and econ- 
omic consequences. If the dividing-line b tween 
health and disease is artificial then neither health 
nor disease are self-evident conditions, but states 
which have to be claimed. 
Different Perspectives 
The 'sociocultural perspective' and the 'medical 
perspective' on health and disease are usually 
differentiated asfollows. 
ticaI coping capacities of individuals. 1 But, of 
course, both forms of assessment are open to dis- 
cussion. Should unwanted pregnancy be con- 
sidered a form of disease? Should alcohol and 
smoking addiction be thought of as forms of 
deviant and punishable behaviour, or as con- 
ditions which need medical care? Coping ca- 
pacities may be influenced by such factors as 
personal attitude, social environment, financial 
resources, and family life. 
In individualised, permissive and wealthy 
societies views of health and disease tend to di- 
verge markedly from those found in insulated 
and poor communities. Dubos relates a well- 
known example 2 of an Indian tribe in which a 
particular skin disease was so prevalent that 'the 
diseased' were considered normal and the 'non- 
diseased' ill. As Dubos noted, health and disease 
are not entities but concepts used to characterise a 
process of adaptation tothe changing demands of 
life and the changing meanings we give to living. 
If this is true then the 'sociocultural perspective' 
cannot offer an absolute demarcation between 
health and disease. Is medicine able to provide a 
more definitive account? 
The Sociocultural Perspective 
The 'sociocultural view' of health and disease 
defines health and disease, at least in part, accord- 
ing to prevalent cultural values and social stan- 
dards. 1 While the details of these values and 
standards vary between cultures, in general social 
groups judge health and illness against standards 
of adaptation. Thus categories of health and dis- 
ease are created in two main ways: by reference to 
broad cultural norms (ethical, philosophical, and 
religious traditions) and by reference to the prac- 
The Medical Perspective 
Generally speaking, it is possible to distinguish 
between two medical concepts of disease: the 
'empirical' and the 'conceptual'. Through the cen- 
turies these two concepts have developed into 
firmly established octrines, each of which has 
many supporters. These doctrines can be traced to 
the ideas of the rival medical schools of Cos and 
Cnidos (islands which lie 20 kilometres apart in 
the Aegean sea) which flourished uring the 5th 
to the 2nd centuries B.C. 
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The Coan* or empirical conception is best 
exemplified by Hippocratean writings. 3 In his 
books the famous doctor gives a detailed escrip- 
tion of the patient: the general impression he 
makes on the doctor, the patient's stools, the 
colour of his vomit: and also describes the context 
of the patient's life his social circumstances, the 
climate, prevailing winds, his housing, and so on. 
From these aspects the Hippocratean method is to 
form a prognosis based on the doctor's experi- 
ence, and to prescribe natural ingredients as 
remedies. No specific diagnosis is made. The di- 
agnosis is the patient's condition: Mr Smith is ill. 4 
The Hippocratean description is clearly patient 
rather than disease oriented, and modem readers 
are not able to make any recognisable diagnosis 
from these descriptions. 
By contrast the Cnidian school insists on a clear 
definition of a disease. Given that typical con- 
figurations of symptoms and signs are said to 
constitute general 'disease categories', a new 
patient-case can be diagnosed by correlating the 
presenting symptoms with those of a predefined 
disease. 5 This, of course, is the forerunner of the 
disease descriptions found in current medical 
textbooks. In fact, the Cnidian school was the first 
to attempt to systemise and classify diseases into a 
taxonomy. 
Theory Makes a Practical Difference 
It makes a great difference to the resulting medi- 
cal judgement whether the diagnosing doctor is a 
follower of the empirical or the conceptual doc- 
trine. The empirical doctrine allows the doctor to 
diagnose the presenting condition in terms of a 
unique combination of symptoms and signs (a 
descriptive diagnosis) whereas the 'conceptual' 
doctor must identify the condition by 'fitting it' 
into a predefined taxonomy of diseases. 
The freedom inherent to the empirical ap- 
proach is particularly welcomed in family medi- 
cine and primary health care. But this is a less 
precise form of medicine, and diagnosing particu- 
lar symptom presentations observed in unique 
individuals can bring the mpiricist into conflict 
with those authorities which demand an un- 
equivocal statement about the 'health status' of a 
* Originating from Cos. 
patient. Consequently, in order to minimise con- 
flict, the empirical doctor is forced to make use of 
codes that are part of the official nosology, while 
trying to avoid rigidity as far as possible (and thus 
will tend to mix---often uneasily--the mpirical 
doctrine with the conceptual). 
Elusive Foundations 
'We in medicine are always arguing the ques- 
tion whether 'there is' such a thing as disease 
and what 'the nature of disease' is, while we 
have no concept of disease which can form the 
inter-subjectively controllable basis for such a 
debate'. 6 
The idea that here is a universally accepted, 
objective foundation for all disease 7 has faded 
over time. Different sorts of taxonomy have been 
"... the empiricist approach to diagnosis 
can conflict with the demands of official 
authorities..." 
found to be necessary (in order to categorise 
"mental illness' and 'physical illness', to give one 
example). Furthermore, medicine has expanded 
its boundaries by incorporating not only newly 
recognised isease but also illnesses defined in- 
itially in 'folk lore'--such as the 'common cold', 
'cold on the bladder', 'heavy food dyspepsia', 
'spice oil diarrhoea', and 'wear and tear of joints'. 
Newly discovered iseases uch as: SID (Sudden 
Infant Death), MBDS (Minimal Brain Damage 
Syndrome), PID (Pelvic Inflammatory Disease), 
Post-natal Depression, IBS (Irritable Bowel Syn- 
drome), ME (Myalgia Encephalomyelitis), and 
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, have been included 
in the nosology, but without a pathophysiological 
substrate, correct legitimation or proper classifi- 
cation. They are but convenient names without 
explanatory or p edictive meaning, s 
The result is a very confusing world, a mixture 
of empirical (Hippocratean) and conceptual 
(Galenian) views. 
Consequences 
What are the consequences of this confusion? 9 
The general opinion, and especially that of 
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established social institutions and insurance com- 
panies, holds that it is the doctor's job to recognise 
an illness, confer the 'sick status' on the potential 
patient, establish priorities, and take the initiative 
in dealing with the patient's health problems. 1°
Western societies have bestowed the doctor with 
this authority, and he is expected to draw a clear 
and unambiguous line between health and dis- 
ease. At present the right to decide lies with the 
doctor. But, given the theoretical confusion-- 
given that there is no clear demarcation line-- 
should the doctor have this right? 
Mechanic 2 calls medicine 'a social institution as 
well as a technical ctivity which is shaped by the 
economic and sociocultural context in which it is 
embedded'. Asa social institution, health care has 
become asuccess tory (viewed from certain per- 
spectives, at least), but its expansion threatens 
other social institutions. Enlarging the medical 
horizon to states of pre-illness (and implementing 
preventive strategies) does seem tohave brought 
about improved health for younger persons 
(and decreased infant mortality rates), but this 
"... it is still widely believed that health 
care can provide a panacea for the miseries 
of human life..." 
improvement has not been effected for the elder 
population so far. In 1841 the life expectancy ofa 
50-year old man in Britain was 20.0 years. In 1976 
it was 22.7 years and has changed little since. 11 
The successes of antibiotics and vaccines raised 
high expectations about medical competence in
providing health and happiness among the public 
as well as among medical scientists. Those expec- 
tations, however, did not materialise. Neverthe- 
less, it is still widely believed that health care can 
provide a panacea for many, if not all, miseries of 
human life. 
Within a period of nearly 20 years (1974-1991) 
the number of patient contacts with doctors in 
primary health care tripled in The Netherlands. 
In the same period contacts with specialists 
doubled. Within a period of just 10 years (1981- 
1991) contacts with physiotherapists increased by 
74% and by 55% with alternative healers. The 
costs of health care rose from 5.4% in 1968 to over 
8.5% of the GNP. As Horrobin has said: 
'... these escalating costs have not been ac- 
companied either by equivalent objective 
therapeutic success or by equivalent rises in 
patient satisfaction. Our patients die marvel- 
lously documented, technologically assisted 
deaths, but they die in much the same ways and 
at much the same age as they did in 1960'. 11 
Conclusion 
A number of problems and uncertainties have 
been raised by this brief review. Although they 
are well-known in philosophical nd social scien- 
tific circles they are otherwise consistently 
ignored. But I call for a wider debate about hem. 
If medicine cannot come to terms with its own 
confusing terminology and methodology; if
medicine cannot stop raising expectations it
cannot fulfil; if medicine does not deliberately 
restrict its boundaries; and if medicine does not 
take serious teps to explain why it chooses to call 
some conditions states of health and others states 
of disease; then the result must be that health 
policy (which medicine largely continues to 
direct) will either be simply an arbitrary matter, or 
will be implemented on the basis of economic 
arguments. Where everything else is imprecise 
the discipline that offers precision will triumph. 
And the evidence of the moment is that this is 
exactly what is happening. 
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